We introduce the logic ITL e , an intuitionistic temporal logic based on structures (W, , S), where is used to interpret intuitionistic implication and S is a -monotone function used to interpret temporal modalities. Our main result is that the satisfiability and validity problems for ITL e are decidable. We prove this by showing that the logic enjoys the strong finite model property. In contrast, we also consider a 'persistent' version of the logic, ITL p , whose models are similar to Cartesian products. We prove that, unlike ITL e , ITL p does not have the finite model property.
Introduction
Intuitionistic logic [6, 22] and its modal extensions [9, 27, 28] play a crucial role in the area of computer science and artificial intelligence. For instance, Pearce's Equilibrium Logic [26] , which characterises the Answer Set semantics [21, 23] of logic programs (ASP), is defined in terms of the intermediate logic of Here and There [15] , together with a minimisation criterion. Extensions of Here and There logic allowed the ASP paradigm, already used in a wide range of domains [1, 3, 14, 16, 25] , to be applied to reasoning about temporal or epistemic scenarios [5, 10] while satisfying the theorem of strong equivalence [4, 20, 10] , central to logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning.
Such modal extensions of Here and There logic are simple cases of a modal intuitionistic logic; in general, the study of such logics can be a challenging enterprise [28] . In particular, there is a huge gap that must be filled regarding combinations of intuitionistic and linear time temporal logic. Nevertheless, there have been several efforts in this direction, including logics with 'past' and 'future' tenses [9] or with 'next' , 'eventually' ♦ and/or 'henceforth' modalities. The main contributions to the field include the following:
• Davies' intuitionistic temporal logic with [7] was provided Kripke semantics and a complete deductive system by Kojima and Igarashi [18] .
• Logics with , were axiomatized by Kamide and Wansing [17] , where was interpreted over bounded time.
• Nishimura [24] provided a sound and complete axiomatization for an intuitionistic variant of the propositional dynamic logic PDL.
• Balbiani and Diéguez [2] axiomatized the Here and There variant of LTL with , ♦, .
• Davoren [8] introduced topological semantics for temporal logics and Fernán-dez-Duque [11] proved the decidability of a logic with , ♦ and a universal modality based on topological semantics.
With the exception of [8, 11] , semantics for intuitionistic LTL use frames of the form (W, , S), where is a partial order used to interpret the intuitionistic implication and S is a binary relation used to interpret temporal operators. Since we are interested in linear time, we will restrict our attention to the case where S is a function. Thus, for example, p is true on some world w ∈ W whenever p is true on S(w). Note, however, that S cannot be an arbitrary function. Intuitionistic semantics have the feature that, for any formula ϕ and worlds w v ∈ W , if ϕ is true on w then it must also be true of v; that is, truth is monotone. If we want this property to be preserved by formulas involving , we need for and S to satisfy certain confluence properties. In the literature, one generally considers frames satisfying 1. w v implies S(w) S(v) (forward confluence, or simply confluence), and 2. if u S(w), there is v w such that S(v) = u (backward confluence). We will call frames satisfying these conditions persistent frames (see Sec. 3), mainly due to the fact that they are closely related to (persistent) products of modal logics [12] . Persistent frames for intuitionistic LTL are the frames of the modal logic S4 × LTL, which is non-axiomatizable. For this reason, it may not be surprising that it is unknown whether the intuitionistic temporal logic of persistent frames, which we denote ITL p , is decidable. However, as we will see in Proposition 1, only forward confluence is needed for truth of all formulas to be monotone, even in the presence of ♦ and . The frames satisfying this condition are, instead, related to expanding products of modal logics [13] , which are often decidable even when the corresponding product is non-axiomatizable. This suggests that dropping the backwards confluence could also lead to a more manageable intuitionistic temporal logic. This logic, which we denote ITL e , is the focus of the present paper and, as we will prove in this paper, it enjoys a crucial advantage over ITL p : ITL e has the strong finite model property (hence, it is decidable), but ITL p does not. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, ITL e is the first known decidable intuitionistic temporal logic that 1. is conservative over propositional intuitionistic logic, 2. includes (or can define) the three modalities , ♦, , and 3. is interpreted over infinite time.
Syntax and semantics
We will work in the language L of LTL given by the following grammar:
where p is an element of a countable set of propositional variables P. Given any formula ϕ, we write SF(ϕ) for the set of subformulas of ϕ and |ϕ| for the cardinality of SF(ϕ).
A dynamic poset is a tuple (W, , S), where W is a non-empty set of states, is a partial order, and S is a function from W to W that satisfies the following (forward) confluence condition:
An intuitionistic dynamic model, or simply a model, is a tuple M = (W, , S, V ) consisting of a dynamic poset equipped with a valuation function V from W to sets of propositional variables satifying the monotonicity condition:
In the standard way, we define S 0 (w) = w and, for all k > 0, S k (w) = S S k−1 (w) . Then we define the satisfaction relation |= inductively by:
Given a model M = (W, , S, V ), a set Σ of formulas, and w ∈ W , we write Σ M (w) for the set {ψ ∈ Σ | M, w ψ}; the subscript 'M' is omitted when it is clear from the context. An eventuality in M is a pair (w, ϕ), where w ∈ W and ϕ is a formula such that either ϕ = ♦ψ for some formula ψ and M, w ϕ, or ϕ = ψ for some formula ψ and M, w ϕ. The fulfillment of an eventuality (w, ϕ) is the finite sequence v 0 . . . v n of states of the model such that 1. for all k ≤ n, v 0 = S k (w), 2. if ϕ = ♦ψ then M, v n ψ and for all k < n, M, v k ψ, and 3. if ϕ = ψ then M, v n ψ and for all k < n, M, v k ψ.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable over a class Ω of models if there is a model M ∈ Ω and a world w so that M, w ϕ, and valid over Ω if, for every world w of every model M ∈ Ω, M, w ϕ. Satisfiability (resp. validity) over the class of all intuitionisitic dynamic models is called satisfiability (resp. validity) for the expanding domain intuitionisitic temporal logic ITL e . We will justify this terminology in the next section. First, we remark that dynamic posets impose the minimal conditions on S and in order to preserve the upwards-closure of valuations of formulas. Below, we will use the notation ϕ = {w ∈ W | M, w ϕ}. Proof. That 1 implies 2 follows by a standard structural induction on ϕ. The case where ϕ ∈ P follows from the condition on V and most inductive steps are routine. Consider the case where ϕ = ψ, and suppose that w v and w ∈ ϕ . Then, for all i ∈ N, M, S i (w) ψ. Since S is confluent, an easy induction shows that, for all i ∈ N, S i (w) S i (v). Therefore, from the induction hypothesis we obtain that M, S i (v) ψ for all i, hence v ∈ ϕ . Other cases are similar or easier. Now we prove that 2 implies 1 by contrapositive. Suppose that (W, , S) does not satisfy (1), so that there are w v such that S(w) S(v). Choose p ∈ P and define V (u) = {p} if w u, V (u) = ∅ otherwise. It is easy to see that V satisfies the monotonicity condition (2) 
We are concerned with the satisfiability and validity problems for ITL e . Observe that satisfiability in propositional intuitionistic logic is equivalent to satisfiability in classical propositional logic. This is because, if ϕ is classically satisfiable, it is trivially intuitionistically satisfiable in a one-world model; conversely, if ϕ is intuitionistically satisfiable, it is satisfiable in a finite model, hence in a maximal world of that finite model, and the generated submodel of a maximal world is a classical model. Thus it may be surprising that the same is not the case for intuitionistic temporal logic: Lemma 2. Any formula ϕ of the temporal language that is classically satisfiable is satisfiable in a dynamic poset. However, there is a formula satisfiable on a dynamic poset that is not classically satisfiable.
Proof. If ϕ is satisfied on a classical model M, then we may regard M as an intuitionistic model by letting be the identity. On the other hand, consider the formula ¬ p ∧ ¬ ¬p. Classically, this formula is equivalent to ¬ p ∧ p, and hence unsatisfiable. Define a model M = (W, , S, V ), where W = {w, v, u}, x y if x = y or x = v, y = u, S(w) = v and S(x) = x otherwise, and V (u) = {p}. Then, one can check that M, w ¬ p ∧ ¬ ¬p.
Hence the decidability of the intuitionistic satisfiability problem is not a corollary of the classical case. In Section 5, we will prove that both the satisfiability and the validity problems are decidable.
Expanding and persistent frames
In this section, we discuss expanding and persistent models, and compare them to dynamic models as we have defined above.
Expanding model property
The logic ITL e is closely related to expanding products of modal logics [13] . In this subsection, we introduce stratified and expanding frames, and show that satisfiability and validity on arbitrary models is equivalent to satisfiability and validity on expanding models. To do this, it is convenient to represent posets using acyclic graphs. 
is a labeled tree, and 3. if w ∈ W n then S(w) ∈ W n+1 . If M is stratified, we write n , S n , and V n instead of ⇂ Wn , S⇂ Wn , and V ⇂ Wn and write M n = (W n , n , V n ). If moreover we have that S(w) S(v) implies w v, then we say that M is an expanding model. Given a finite, non-empty set of formulas Σ closed under subformulas, a model M = (W, , S, V ), and a state w ∈ W , we will construct a stratified model M e = (W e , e , S e , V e ) such that for the root w e of W e 0 , Σ(w e ) = Σ(w). To this end, we first define the set D = N × N × 2 Σ of possible defects. Since Σ is finite and not empty, we assume that D is ordered such that for each k ∈ N, the k
e is defined from all these tuples and the whole construction proceeds as follows:
Inductive case. Let k > 0 and suppose that (U k , ↑ k , h k ) has already been constructed. Let (x, y, S) be the k th element of D. If (D1) (x, y) ∈ U k , (D2) Σ(h k (x, y)) = S, and (D3) there is v ∈ W such that h k (x, y) v and Σ(v) = S, then we construct (U k+1 , ↑ k+1 , h k+1 ) such that:
and
Lemma 6. M
e is an expanding model.
Proof. First we check that M e is stratified. By Lemma 5, e is antisymetric, hence a partial order. For the monotonicity condition, suppose that (x, y)
e is a model. To prove that M e is stratified, define W e n = {(x, y) ∈ W e | y = n} for all n ∈ N. Conditions 3 of Def. 4 trivially holds and condition 1 comes directly from Lemma 5. To prove condition 2, it suffices to observe that by construction, for all (x, y) ∈ W e , either x = 0 or there is exactly one state ( y) . Therefore, by Lemma 5, for all (x, y) ∈ W e , there is a unique path from (0, y) to (x, y). Finally, to prove that M e is expanding, suppose that (c, b) ∈ W e and (a,
th element of D is (a, y, S) for some y, S. Moreover, since (c, b) ∈ W e , b ≥ y and since (x, y) ∈ W e , (a, b) ∈ W e and (a, b) ↑ e (c, b). Therefore it can easily be proved by induction on the length of the path from S e (w) to S e (v) that S e (w) e S e (v) implies w e v.
Lemma 7. For any state (x, y) ∈ W e and any ψ ∈ Σ, M e , (x, y) ψ if and only if M, h x (x, y) ψ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size |ψ| of the formula. The cases for propositional variables, falsum, conjunctions and disjunctions are straightforward. For the temporal modalities, it suffices to observe that for all (x, y) ∈ W e and all n ∈ N, (x, y + n) ∈ W e and h x (x, y + n) = S n (h x (x, y)). Finally, for implication, suppose first that M e , (x, y)
In conclusion, we obtain the following: 
Persistent frames
Expanding models were introduced as a weakening of product models. They often lead to logics with a less complex validity problem. Thus it is natural to also consider a variant of ITL e interpreted over product models, or over the somewhat wider class of persistent models. Definition 9. Let (W, ) be a poset. If S : W → W is such that, whenever v S(w), there is u w such that v = S(u), we say that S is backward confluent. If S is both forward and backward confluent, we say that it is persistent. A tuple (W, , S) where S is persistent is a persistent intuitionistic temporal frame, and the set of valid formulas over the class of persistent intuitionistic temporal frames is denoted ITL p , or persistent domain LTL.
The name 'persistent' comes from the fact that Theorem 8 can be modified to obtain a stratified model M ′ where
is an isomorphism, i.e. whose domains are persistent with respect to S ′ . As we will see, the finite model property fails over the class of persistent models. Proof. Consider the model M = (W, , S, V ), where W = Z∪{r} with r a fresh world not in Z, w v if and only if w = r or w = v, S(r) = r and S(n) = n + 1 for n ∈ Z, and p = [0, ∞). It is readily seen that M is a persistent model, that M, r ¬¬♦ p (since every maximal world above r satisfies ♦ p), yet M, r ♦¬¬ p, since there is no n such that M, S n (r) ¬¬ p. It follows that M, r ϕ, and hence ϕ is not valid, as claimed.
Lemma 11. The formula ϕ (from Lemma 10) is valid over the class of finite, persistent models. 
Combinatorics of intuitionistic models
In this section we introduce some combinatorial tools we will need in order to prove that ITL e has the strong finite model property, and hence is decidable. We begin by discussing labeled structures, which allow for a graph-theoretic approach to intuitionistic models. 
Labeled structures and quasimodels

Simulations, immersions and condensations
As is well-known, truth in intuitionistic models is preserved by bisimulation, and thus this is usually the appropriate notion of equivalence between different models. However, for our purposes, it is more convenient to consider a weaker notion, which we call bimersion. It will typically be convenient to work with immersions rather than simulations: however, as the next lemma shows, not much generality is lost by this restriction. Condensations are useful for producing (small) quasimodels out of models.
Definition 17. Given two labeled posets A = (W
Proposition 19. Given an intuitionistic dynamic model
M = (W M , M , V M ), a
set Σ of intuitionistic formulas that is closed for subformulas, and a
Then, M, ι(w) ϕ → ψ, so that there is v ∈ W A such that ι(w) A v, M, v ϕ and M, v ψ. It follows that ϕ ∈ λ(ρ(v)) and ψ ∈ λ(ρ(v)), and since ρ is an immersion we also have that w = ρι(w) ρ(v), as needed.
Normalized labeled trees
In order to count the number of different labeled trees up to bimersion, we construct, for any set Λ of labels and any k ≥ 1, the labeled directed acyclic graph 
Inductive case. Suppose that
is constructed such that:
is typically not a tree, but we may unravel it to obtain one. Proof. Let T = (W, ↑, λ) be a labeled directed acyclic graph with root r. We write ≺ for the transitive closure of ↑ and for the reflexive closure of ≺. The proof is by induction on the level n = lvl(T ) of T . For n = 1, observe that this means that λ(w) = λ(r) for all w ∈ W . Let ρ = W × {λ(r)} and ι = {(λ(r), r)}. It can easily be checked that (ρ, ι) is a condensation. For n > 1, suppose the property holds for all rooted labeled trees T ′ such that lvl(T ) ′ < n. Define the following sets:
Clearly, for all w ∈ N , lvl(w) < n. Therefore, by induction, there is a condensation (ρ w , ι w ) from the subgraph of T generated by w to the unraveling of G Λ n−1 from some y w ∈ W Λ n−1 . Let us define r ′ = (λ(r), {y w | w ∈ N }) and consider the unraveling G of G Λ n from r ′ . It can easily be checked that ρ = (S × {r ′ })∪ w∈W ρ w is an immersion from T to G, ι ′ = {(r ′ , r)}∪ w∈W ι w is a simulation from G to T and ι ′ ⊆ ρ −1 . Using Lemma 18, we can then choose an immersion ι ⊆ ι ′ , so that (ρ, ι) is a condensation from T to G.
Finally, let us define recursively E n k and Q n k for all n, k ∈ N by:
The following lemma can be proven by a straightforward induction, left to the reader. 1. Given a set of labels Λ and a Λ-labeled tree T of level
′ the normalized Λ-labeled tree for T .
Given a sequence of
The second item may be viewed as a finitary variant of Kruskal's theorem for labeled trees [19] . When applied to quasimodels, we obtain the following: Proposition 24. Let Σ be a set of formulas closed under subformulas with |Σ| = s < ω.
Given a tree-like Σ-quasimodel T and a formula ϕ, there is a tree-like
. We call T ′ the normalized Σ-quasimodel for T .
Given a sequence of tree-like
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 19 and Lemma 22 using the fact that any Σ-quasimodel has level at most s + 1.
Finally, we obtain an analogous result for pointed structures. 
. By Proposition 21, A condenses to a generated tree T of G Λ ′ k+2 by some condensation (ρ, ι). Let w ′ = ρ(w), and consider T as a pointed structure with distinguished point w ′ . Given that ρ is a surjective, label-preserving function, w, w ′ are the only points whose label has second component 1, and therefore (ρ, ι) must be a pointed condensation, as claimed.
Proposition 27. Let Σ be a set of formulas closed under subformulas with |Σ| = s < ω.
Given a tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodel T and a formula ϕ, there is a tree-like pointed
s+3 . We call T ′ the normalized pointed Σ-quasimodel for T .
2. Given a sequence of tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodels T 1 , . . . , T n with n > E
Decidability
The following transformations are defined for any stratified model M and any finite, non-empty set of formulas Σ closed under subformulas. In each case, given a stratified model M = (W, , S, V ), we will produce another stratified model
Replace M k with a copy of the normalized Σ-quasimodel of M k . Let T = (W T , ↑ T , λ T ) be a copy of the normalized labeled tree of M 
The map π is the identity on
Replace M k with a copy of the normalized, pointed Σ-quasimodel of M k preserving w, where w ∈ W k . The transformation is similar to the previous one except that M k is regarded as a pointed structure with distinguished point w.
Replace M ℓ with M k , where k < ℓ and there is an immersion σ : W k → W ℓ (seen as 2 Σ -labeled trees). The result of the transformation is the tuple
Replace M ℓ with M k connecting w k to w ℓ , where k < ℓ, w k ∈ W k , w ℓ ∈ W ℓ and there is an immersion σ : W k → W ℓ such that σ(w k ) = w ℓ . The transformation is defined as the previous one.
Lemma 28. The result of any previous transformation is a stratified model such that
is a model is straighforward and left to the reader. We prove by structural induction on ϕ that for all transformations, all w ∈ W ′ and all ϕ ∈ Σ, M ′ , w ϕ iff M, π(w) ϕ. We only detail the case for the next modality when M k is replaced with a copy of the normalized Σ-quasimodel T of M k and w ∈ W • The variable i, initialized to 0, indicates the current labeled trees W i which is considered.
• The variable j, initialy undefined, indicates the index of the first labeled trees occuring infinitely often up to bimersion.
• The variable ℓ, initialy undefined, holds the index of the last labeled tree that must not be modified.
As an invariant, M is stratified until the final step and for all k < i, M k is a copy of a normalized labeled tree.
First phase.
• If there is k < i such that M k M i , replace M i with M k , set i to k + 1 and redo the same phase.
• If not, and for all x > i there is y > x such that M y M i , then replace M i with a copy of its normalized Σ-quasimodel, increase i by one, set j and ℓ to i and start the next phase.
• Otherwise, replace M i with its normalized Σ-quasimodel, increase i by one and redo the same phase.
Second phase. In this phase, we need to care about eventualities. To this end, a current eventuality (w, ψ), initialy undefined, is maintained across the executions of the phase. Let w x denote the element of the fulfillment of (w, ψ) belonging to W x (if it exists), and M + x be the pointed structure M wx x . The phase proceeds through the following steps:
• If (w, ψ) is defined and the last element of the fulfillment of (w, ψ) belongs to some W k with k ≤ i then undefine (w, ψ), set ℓ to i and repeat the same phase.
• If (w, ψ) is undefined then choose an eventuality (w, ψ) such that w ∈ W j and the last element of its fulfillment belongs to some W k with k > i. If there is no such eventuality then start the next phase.
• If (w, ψ) is defined and there is k such that ℓ < k < i and M + k M + i , then replace M i with M k connecting w k to w i , set i to k + 1 and redo the same phase.
• Otherwise, replace M i with a copy of the normalized labeled tree of M k preserving w i , increase i and redo the same phase.
Third phase.
• If M i M j , then start the final step.
• If there is k such that ℓ < k < i and M k M i , then replace M i with M k , set i to k + 1 and redo the same phase.
• Otherwise, replace M i with a copy of its normalized Σ-quasimodel, increase i by one and redo the same phase.
Final step. There is an immersion σ : Proof. The proof that M fin = W fin , fin , S fin , V fin is a model is straightforward and left to the reader. We prove by structural induction on ϕ that for all w ∈ W fin and all ϕ ∈ Σ, M fin , w ϕ iff M, w ϕ. The cases for propositional variables and the boolean connectives are straightforward. The case for the next temporal modality is similar as in the proof of Lemma 28. For the eventually and henceforth temporal modalities, suppose first that (w, ϕ) is an eventuality in M and w ∈ W fin . Let w 0 . . . w n be the fulfillment of (w, ϕ) in M. If w n ∈ W fin then by induction hypothesis, (w, ϕ) is an eventuality in M fin . Otherwise, there is k ≤ n such that w k ∈ W i . Therefore, (w k , ϕ) is an eventuality in M and so is (σ(w k ), ϕ). Since by construction, after the second phase, the length of the fulfillment of any eventuality (v, ϕ) such that v ∈ W j is bounded by 1 + i − j, (w, ϕ) is an eventuality in M fin . Conversely, suppose now that (w, ϕ) is an eventuality in M fin and let w 0 . . . w n be its fulfillment. For each k ≤ n let m k be such that w k ∈ W m k . The proof is by a subinduction on the number r of k ∈ 1 . . n such that m k = j. If r = 0 then by induction hypothesis, (w, ϕ) is is an eventuality in M. If r > 0, let k > 0 be the least index such that m k = j. If k = n then suppose that ϕ = ♦ψ, the other case beeing symmetric. When have M fin , w k ψ and by induction M, w k ψ. Since k > 0, w k = S fin (w k−1 ) = σ(S(w k−1 )) and since σ is an immersion, M, S(w k−1 ) ψ. Therefore (w, ϕ) is an eventuality in M. Finally, if r > 0 and k < n then (w k , ϕ) is an eventuality in M fin and by the subinduction hypothesis (w k , ϕ) is an eventuality in M. Since k > 0, w k = S fin (w k−1 ) = σ(S(w k−1 )). Morevoer, since σ is an immersion, (S(w k−1 ), ϕ) is an eventuality in M. Hence (w, ϕ) is an eventuality in M. where s = |Σ|.
Proof. Let us consider the stratified model M = (W, , S, V ) obtained after the third phase. For all k < i, W k is a copy either of a normalized Σ-quasimodel or of a pointed normalized Σ-quasimodel. By Propositions 24 and 27, for all k < i,
s+3 . We prove now that i ≤ 2E . Therefore, during the second phase, the current eventuality is defined at most sQ We have proved the following strong finite model property.
Theorem 31. There exists a computable function B such that for any formula ϕ ∈ L, if ϕ is satisfiable (resp. unsatisfiable) then ϕ is satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) in a model M = (W, , S, V ) such that |W | ≤ B(|ϕ|).
Proof. In view of Theorem 8, a formula ϕ is satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) in a model M if and only if it is satisfied (resp. falsified) at the root of a stratified model M e . Then, by Lemma 29, ϕ is satisfied (resp. falsified) in M e if and only if it is satisfied (res. falsified) on (M e ) fin , which is effectively bounded by B(|ϕ|) by Lemma 30.
As a corollary, we get the decidability of ITL e .
Corollary 32. The satisfiability and validity problems for ITL e are decidable.
Conclusion
We have introduced ITL e , an intuitionistic analogue of LTL based on expanding domain models from modal logic. In the literature, intuitionistic modal logic is typically interpreted over persistent models, but as we have shown this interpretation has the technical disadvantage of not enjoying the finite model property. Of course, this fact alone does not imply that ITL p is undecidable, and whether the latter is true remains an open problem. Meanwhile, our semantics are natural in the sense that we impose the minimal conditions on S so that any formula is true on an upwards-closed set under , and a wider class of models is convenient as they can more easily be tailored for specific applications. This is an exploratory work, being the first to consider the logic ITL e . As can be gathered from the tools we have developed, understanding this logic poses many technical challenges, and many interesting questions remain open. Perhaps the most pressing is the complexity of validity and satisfiability: the decision procedure we have given is non-elementary, but there seems to be little reason to assume that this is optimal. It may be possible to further 'trim' the model M fin to obtain one that is elementarily bounded. However, we should not expect polynomially bounded models, as ITL e is conservative over intuitionistic propositional logic, which is already PSpace-complete. Finally, we leave open the problem of finding a sound and complete axiomatization for ITL e .
